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ABSTRACT
In the late 1850s, officials of the United States State Department began a 
correspondence with various European governments to inform them of the 
department’s desire that the sale of inland passage tickets on the Continent be 
banned. These vouchers provided for migrants’ transatlantic passage as well 
as further transport to a desired point past the US’s eastern coast. Fraudulent 
versions of these passes had been showing up on the country’s shores, 
leaving many of the purchasers stranded in New York City without recourse. 
The federal push for a prohibition of the trade looked to stop such a situation 
from happening again. Through the efforts of US consuls who petitioned 
European governments, leveraged the power of the press, and engaged in 
other diplomatic tactics, a widespread ban was successfully put in place. The 
inland passage ticket issue constitutes an understudied yet significant moment 
on the timeline towards full, formal federalization of US immigration policy by 




Chapter 1. “A Mode of Correcting the Existing Evils”: Swindlers,
Inland Passage Tickets, and the Federalization of 
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discussions, and much-needed injections of humor from beginning to end of its 
winding journey. Cindy Hahamovitch shepherded me through the overwhelmingly 
vast literature on nineteenth-century US immigration and offered invaluable 
feedback on framing a more subtle argument. Her editorial suggestions improved 
the final product tremendously. Likewise, Carol Sheriff read drafts with a keen 
eye, making sure I did not lose sight of the bigger picture. My heartfelt thanks to 
you all. Of course, any remaining missteps in the text or argument are mine 
alone.
To the members of my squad: Peter Olsen-Harbich, Matt Niendorf, Stephen 
Vickory, Nate Holly, and Eive Bourbeau-Allard, thanks for maintaining my sanity 
within graduate school. The same to the rest of my cohort. To my friends back 
home in Wisconsin and elsewhere, thanks for reminding me that there is a world 
outside academia. My appreciation for Ben Kellner knows no bounds. I was 
always grateful for his check-ins on the status of this project. Thanks for the read- 
through in the draft’s latter stages, and for the laughs most of all.
Utmost thanks to my undergraduate thesis advisor David M. McDonald, who 
inspired me to set off down the path of the historian. He taught me more about 
how to practice the craft than he will ever know, even if it seemed like we were 
just shooting the breeze about hockey.
Finally, to my parents: I would be nowhere close to the man I am today without 
your kindness, generosity, and support. A full relating of my appreciation for you 
would fill innumerable pages. Simply put, thank you for allowing me to pursue my 
passions even when they looked like pipedreams. I love you both.
“...ever encourage that continual and fearless sifting and winnowing by which 
alone the truth can be found.”
-- 1894 Report of the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents
Arriving in New York City in the middle of the nineteenth century, European 
migrants would have found themselves in the middle of a bustling scene. Scores of 
dockworkers would have carried baggage and trunks to and fro, with luggage owners 
following close behind.1 Some of the passengers stepping off ships would have had a 
piece of paper called an “inland passage ticket” clutched in their hand or stowed in a 
pocket. This voucher ostensibly provided for a migrant’s ocean passage, as well as 
transport to a desired point somewhere beyond the Eastern Seaboard. After working then- 
way through the crowd immediately surrounding the docked vessel, a soul who possessed 
one of these slips would venture to the nearest railroad terminal and present it to an 
employee. In some cases, the holder would learn that that their ticket was invalid: the 
company whose services it provided for did not exist, the individual who sold it had no 
authority in a firm that did, or perhaps he or she did not even work for said enterprise. 
This unfortunate turn of events left the migrant with one of two alternatives: remain in 
New York or purchase a legitimate ticket. Most swindled passengers had little choice but 
to stay where they were because they lacked the funds to reach their intended destination, 
having spent them on a worthless facsimile of a ticket.
With this distressing image in mind, US consul Theodore S. Fay sat at his desk in 
Bern writing to Secretary of State Lewis Cass his thoughts on, and recent efforts against, 
the fraud that so adversely affected such European migrants. Having just printed and 
disseminated copies of a warning against the purchase of inland passage tickets by 
aspiring emigrants, he recognized that such things “are merely collateral and palliative.
1 “Emigrant-Landing in New York,” sketch in “Emigrants, and Emigrant Life,” Harper ’s 
Weekly, June 26, 1858.
1
The real remedy will be a legal prohibition of the sale of inland passage tickets.” Part of 
a steady relay of communications between US consuls, Continental governments, and the 
State Department, Fay’s note is but a single instance of the wider effort to enact a 
wholesale ban on the European sale of inland passage tickets and thus eliminate the 
voucher fraud.
These two vignettes, taken together, offer a window into the shape of US 
immigration policy in the mid-nineteenth century. The fraudulent activities surrounding 
inland passage tickets went beyond the domestic level, forcing officials of the federal 
government to work for a prohibition of the trade. This exercise of (inter)national 
political power deflates the notion that authority over immigration management rested 
solely with individual US states at this time, instead highlighting a move that—among 
several others—led towards the full federalization of immigration policy. That a federal 
response came at this point in history is due to the confluence of several factors, which 
will be explored at the end of the piece.
Though historians of nineteenth-century European immigration to the United 
States have written scores of monographs and articles on seemingly every facet of this 
period’s international migration flows, inland passage tickets—along with their context 
and consequences—have been largely passed over as topic of inquiry. Perhaps this is 
because the action undertaken by the United States government regarding their sale in 
Europe was not codified as policy and because it involved no passage of legislation. In
Fay to Cass, July 22, 1857, U.S. Senate, Executive Document no. 26: Message o f the 
President, in Answer to a Resolution o f the Senate, calling for Information on the Subject 
o f Contracts Made in Europe for Inland Passage Tickets, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: William A. Harris, 1858), 40. Hereafter cited as Inland Passage 
Tickets.
2
fact, the inland passage ticket situation is important not just because of the immigrants it 
financially ruined but because it contributed to the fitful expansion of federal control over 
' immigration policy, which previously fell within the states’ purview.
In the standard narrative of the history of immigration to the United States, the 
earliest national measures in managing immigration emerged with the Chinese Exclusion' 
Act of 1882, or with the Page Act of 1875—elements of which found their way into the 
Exclusion Act.3 This view dates back at least to the 1940s, with Marcus Lee Hansen 
emphasizing the lack of federal involvement in immigration, saying the country gave “no 
encouragement to immigrants except that offered by its opportunities,” and presented “no 
barriers except those confronting native and foreigner alike.” Two decades later, 
Maldwyn Jones put forth similar ideas in American Immigration. Aristide Zolberg has 
termed such works’ outlook on federal immigration management as “benevolently 
neutral.”4 But this is a rather narrow view, as it mistakenly sees sole authority for the 
management of immigration as resting in federal hands.5 Decades prior to the Page or 
Exclusion Acts, many coastal states enacted their own immigration policies, often in an 
effort to deter certain “undesirables” from reaching their shores. Benjamin J. Klebaner
3 Page Act: Library of Congress, United States Statutes at Large, 43rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
477-78; Chinese Exclusion Act: Statutes at Large, 47th Congr., 1st Sess., 58-61. For a 
treatment of the Exclusion Act and its ramifications, see Andrew Gyory, Closing the 
Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1988).
4 Marcus Lee Hansen, The Atlantic Migration 1607-1860: A History o f the Continuing 
Settlement o f the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940); Maldwyn 
Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); 
Aristiede R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning o f 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 3.
5 For a comprehensive treatment of the content in this section, see Gerald L. Neuman, 
“The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875),” Columbia Law Review 
93 no. 8 (December 1993): 1833-1901.
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cites a law passed in New York in 1721 that necessitated either the removal of or a bond 
payment for “any persons that cannot give a good Account of themselves to the Mayor or 
like[ly] to be a Burthen” to New York City, where migrants disembarked. Similar 
measures passed at the state level throughout the rest of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.6 But while individual states played a major role in immigration policy before 
the Page Act, the national government was far from a nonfactor. The Naturalization Act 
of 1790, in allowing “any alien, being a free white person” as long as he or she was “of 
good character” to be able to gain US citizenship after two years’ residence in country, is 
a measure of immigration management when one considers its exclusion of indentured 
servants, Native Americans, blacks both free and slave, and any other nonwhite 
individuals.7 Eight years later, the bundle of legislation known as the Alien and Sedition 
Acts required vessels to declare upon arriving in a US port if they carried any foreign 
nationals, while also giving the president the power “to order all such aliens as he shall 
judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.. .to depart.”8 The ban on the 
slave trade put into effect in 1808 is a federal measure of managing immigration as well, 
albeit of the unfree variety.9
Zolberg’s Nation by Design also draws attention to instances before the oft-cited 
years of 1875 and 1882 in which the federal government became more deeply involved in
6 Benjamin J. Klebaner, “State and Local Immigration Regulation in the United States 
before 1882,” International Review o f Social History 3 no. 2 (August 1958): 292. The 
article as a whole offers a succinct overview of state-level immigration policies across the 
United States.
7 Statutes at Large, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 103.
8 Statutes at Large, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 571, 577-78, 596-97. The Sedition Act remained 
on the books for only a few years, expiring in 1801. Italics in original. See also Zolberg, 
Nation by Design, 87-88, 96.
9 Statutes at Large, 9th Cong., 2nd Sess., 426-30.
4
immigration management, further complicating what he sees as a “prevailing view of
American immigration policy as a single historical line weaving between openness and
restriction at different points in time.”10 He cites the enactment of the 1819 and 1847
Passenger Laws which stipulated space and tonnage quotas per immigrant aboard a vessel
to provide what was hoped to be a safer and more sanitary environment. However,
pushback by shipping interests led to an undercutting of this legislation.11 The Passenger
Cases, argued before the US Supreme Court in 1849, somewhat ambiguously (due to
individual states’ subsequent skirting of the decision’s ramifications) contributed to
federal authority over immigration as well under the Commerce Clause of the US
Constitution.12 Federal-level involvement continued in the 1860s with the passage of
contract labor legislation such as the prohibition of US participation in the “coolie trade”
two years into that decade.13 Donna R. Gabaccia also makes the more general point that
well before legislative action on immigration such as the Page or Chinese Exclusion Acts,
the bilateral trade treaties negotiated to renew or expand trade between the 
United States, Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia determined many of 
the main features of U.S. governance of international migration. Most 
treaties with Europe outlined a reciprocal liberty for persons seeking to 
enter or to trade in either country, along with their goods. Until the 1830s,
10 Zolberg, Nation by Design, 19.
11 On 1819 law, see Zolberg, Nation by Design, 110-113; for 1847, 145-146; for 
pushback, 147, ft. 81, 85. For the text of the 1819 law, Statutes at Large, 15th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 488-89; for 1847, Statutes at Large, 29th Cong., 2nd Sess., 127-28. There was also 
an 1855 law passed with similar purposes in mind, which Zolberg does not address. See 
“An Act to Regulate the Carriage of Passengers in Steamships and other Vessels,” 33rd 
Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 213; 10 Stat. 715, March 3, 1855.
1 7 For text of the case, see https://supreme.iustia.com/cases/federal/us/48/283/case.html. 
See also Zolberg, Nation by Design, 148-150.
13 Statutes at Large, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 340-41. Moon-Ho Jung covers the law in 
“Outlawing Coolies,” the first chapter of his excellent Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, 
and Sugar in the Age o f Emancipation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2006).
5
Americans labeled this treaty-defined liberty to move about and to trade as 
‘free trade.’ Free trade thus carried a very different meaning in the early 
nineteenth century than it does in our own times, when it has come to 
mean instead the removal of tariffs or duties on internationally traded 
goods.14
Thus, while Richard H. Leach’s assertion in a 1950 article that “there were few 
[federal] examples to follow” for “the state of New York and some of its sister states...to 
find acceptable solutions to the issue raised by immigration” may hold for parts of the 
eighteenth century, it is empirically untrue by the late nineteenth.15 Taken together, the 
above instances illustrate how the nationalization of immigration policy that led to the 
forceful assertion of federal authority in the form of the Chinese Exclusion was far from a 
straight line from point A to B. Instead, the federal state periodically intruded into what 
had been largely the purview of individual states, with pushback and evasion of such 
efforts a common occurrence. The inland passage ticket issue of the mid 1850s and 
subsequent actions to manage it constitute an understudied event within this fitful process, 
bringing about clear federal involvement and offering a moment for analysis of the 
winding path towards the full federalization of control over migration management.
This thesis also aims to revive and push forward a much smaller historiography 
from the mid-twentieth century on New York’s Castle Garden emigrant landing depot 
(the precursor to Ellis Island) and emigrant agents, a location and set of characters 
integral to telling the story of inland passage tickets and their context. Leach and Richard 
J. Purcell both examined Castle Garden, but with an emphasis on the depot’s public
14 Donna R. Gabaccia, Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 54; examples of such treaties on 55.
15 Richard H. Leach, “The Impact of Immigration Upon New York, 1840-1860,” New 
York History 31, no. 1 (January 1950): 15.
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health benefits to immigrants rather than any connections to European trade in 
vouchers.16 Similarly, when scholars mention emigrant agents, it is briefly, and they are 
portrayed largely as something immigrants just had to endure. No thought is given as to 
how the problem the agents presented may have been rectified, or what larger 
consequences their presence could indicate.17
Engaging with Oscar Handlin’s The Uprooted, Thomas J. Archdeacon rightly 
avers, “adequately describing the course and effects of immigration would involve ‘no 
less a task than to set down the whole history of the United States.’”18 This project’s aims 
are quite a bit narrower than explaining the whole of American immigration, but it still 
seeks to fill a significant gap in historical understanding. However, because this project 
engages with such an incredibly large historiography, it is crucial to put forth the study’s 
limits. This paper focuses exclusively on European migrants landing in New York. 
Broadly speaking, it is not a story that focuses on lived experiences from migrants’ 
perspectives. It deals with the employment of government efforts to manage migration 
flows; it is not a focused exploration of the choices that led to emigration on an individual
16 Leach, “The Impact of Immigration Upon New York, 1840-1860,” New York History, 
15-30; Richard J. Purcell, “The New York Commissioners of Emigration and Irish 
Immigrants: 1847-1860,” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 37 no. 145 (March 1948): 
29-42.
17 George M. Stephenson, A History o f American Immigration, 1820-1924 (New York: 
Russell & Russell Inc., 1964), 5-6; Philip Taylor, The Distant Magnet: European 
Emigration to the U.S.A. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971), 110-113; Ann Novotny, 
Strangers at the Door: Ellis Island, Castle Garden, and the Great Migration to America 
(Riverside: The Chatham Press, Inc., 1971), 43, 48, 52.
1 ft Thomas J. Archdeacon, “Problems and Possibilities in the Study of American 
Immigration and Ethnic History,” International Migration Review 19 no. 1 (Spring,
1985): 112.
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level.19 Life in the United States post arrival is not at the center of discussion for similar
20reasons.
This is not to discount the richness, complexity, struggle, and pain that all came 
with life as an international migrant during this period. Nor is it an attempt to remove 
agency from those individuals. Far from unwitting pawns swept up by the tide of history 
to crash ashore in a new world, those who purchased inland passage tickets were, by that 
very act, making a conscious choice to move. And that choice intertwined each migrant 
with the US federal government. Donna R. Gabaccia quite correctly writes “no one 
understands better than immigrants the continuing power of national
governments...[I]mmigrants experience the power of nation states in an extremely 
intimate fashion, sometimes on a daily basis.”21 Thus, migrants figure significantly in this 
account, even if biographical details do not.
The origins of the inland passage ticket frauds lay back in Europe, but the trade in 
the vouchers started off innocently. Legitimate transactions for the vouchers took place in
19 For a general introduction see, James M. Bergquist, Daily Life in Immigrant America, 
1820-1870 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2008), 21-57. For an overview of theories of 
migration see, Elizabeth Fussell, “Space, Time, and Volition: Dimensions of Migration 
Theory,” in The Oxford Handbook o f the Politics o f International Migration, eds. Marc R. 
Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 25-52.
20 For studies on this topic (specific to the Irish) cf., Kerby A. Miller, Emigrant and 
Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985) and Lawrence J. McCaffrey, Textures o f Irish America (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1992).
21 Donna R. Gabaccia, Foreign Relations, 2-3; A note on the primary sources used for 
this project: as stated above, the issues surrounding the sale of inland passage tickets have 
been strikingly understudied. The cornerstone of this project’s primary source base will 
be the similarly underutilized international diplomatic correspondence on the topic that 
took place largely between the US State Department, and its consuls residing in Europe, 
as well as the governmental officials of the nations where these diplomats were stationed. 
Further context will be gleaned using a combination of contemporary newspapers, and 
immigration reports from the State of New York.
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the large emigration ports of the day: Liverpool, Limerick, and Bremen, among others.22 
Those looking to emigrate from such places learned of the possibility of purchasing 
inland passage tickets primarily through two sources of advertising: individual US states 
and private railroad companies looking to populate the land adjoining their lines with 
settlers. States and rail lines in the Midwest in particular were major players in attracting 
Europeans by marketing inland passage tickets.
E.H. Thomson, Michigan’s appointed Commissioner of Immigration, took full 
advantage of print advertising to direct European migrants towards his state. He reported 
in 1850 that he had had “a pamphlet [printed] in the German and English languages, 
accompanied by a map of our State, with the entire route laid down from New York to 
the termination of the Michigan central rail road...for distribution in the ports of Great 
Britain and Ireland.” Thomson had the content of the work vetted by Caleb Smith 
Woodhull, mayor of New York, who certified “that full faith and credit might be given 
by emigrants to any advice given by the commissioner on the part of the state of 
Michigan.” The heads of both a German emigrant society and the New York 
Commissioners of Emigration positively assessed the advertisement as well. Thomson 
had 14,000 copies made ready for distribution.24 His efforts soon showed tangible results. 
He wrote that in the previous ninety days leading up to his report, “upwards of twenty
22 “Emigrants,” Harper's Weekly, June 26, 1858, and accompanying sketch “Departure 
from Home.”
23 Theodore C. Blegen, “The Competition of the Northwestern States for Immigrants,” 
Wisconsin Magazine o f History, 3 no.l (September 1919): 3-29.
24 “Report of the Select Committee on the Report of the State Agent of Immigration,” 
Documents Accompanying the Journal o f the Senate o f the State o f Michigan... [1850] 
(Lansing: R.W. Ingals, 1850), 13-14, with page numbers restarting for each document.
The New York Commissioners played a major role in prompting the State Department’s 
response to the inland passage ticket situation, as will be seen below.
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thousand acres of state lands have been purchased” by German settlers in just two 
Michigan counties. As part of their transport package, the state arranged for “a propeller, 
suitable for cabin and steerage passengers” to run from Buffalo, New York, where 
immigrants landed after their trip via railway out of New York City, to Saginaw, 
Michigan. Past that point, “a small river steamboat will take them a considerable distance 
up either the Flint, Cass, Shiawassee or Titabawssee rivers, and in the immediate vicinity 
of the German settlements” if needed.25 Wisconsin officials engaged in similar activities. 
They placed advertising in European newspapers, focusing on German cities from where 
emigrants were known to depart for the US. All the pieces “extoll[ed] the healthy climate, 
the fertile soil, and the general opportunities available” in the state, hoping to direct 
immigrant traffic past the Eastern Seaboard 26
Private railroad companies were the other providers of European inland passage 
tickets. The Illinois Central’s efforts to attract migrants to settle the land around its lines 
in the Midwest are emblematic. Like individual states in this period, the company printed 
advertising material for distribution in Europe.27 Unlike them, the Central also hired 
dedicated agents to work in Europe, advertising inland settlement and arranging transport
25 “Report of the Select Committee,” Documents, 17.
26 Paul Wallace Gates, The Illinois Central Railroad and Its Colonization Work 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 170.
27 Gates, The Illinois Central Railroad, 175. The company also engaged in the rather 
modem advertising practice of “inserting placards in the panels of the Second, Third, and 
Sixth Avenues cars in New York City,” 180. Gates uses letters between the Central’s 
officials for the bulk of his source base of the material that will be cited in this section. 
The railroad’s records are housed in the Newberry Library in Chicago, and I attempted to 
procure copies. However, the documents were not part of the institution’s collection, and 
the archivist I corresponded with thought it most likely they were lost in the move to the 
Newberry in the 1950s. Due to this, Gate’s analysis and quoting will have to be accepted 
at face value.
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to the company’s lands upon the completion of sales. The line assigned Oscar Malmborg 
in 1854 to Norway and Sweden.28 Agents were also deployed to Germany in the same 
year, employing using similar means to spread the virtues of settling on the Central’s land 
holdings. Migrants who decided to move to the US bought “through tickets”—to use Paul 
Wallace Gates’s phrase for inland passage tickets—that would offer combined steamship 
and rail transport to that great hub of the Midwest, Chicago 29
That these two entities both engaged in the sale of inland passage tickets is telling 
for one major reason: not all of the passes on offer were fraudulent. Railroad companies 
and state governments looking to boost immigration offered legitimate means of 
purchasing transport from a European port to a US destination past the East Coast. 
Victims of the racket had no reason to suspect they might be spending their savings on a 
fraudulent ticket, a mistake that could hamstring their new life in the United States. While 
it is impossible to know exactly how prevalent fraudulent tickets were, the ensuing 
response to them shows it to have been a serious issue.
Immigration administrators in New York had become aware of these rackets in 
the early 1850s and wished to eliminate them. They realized that the federal government 
would have to become involved due to the seat of the frauds being in Europe. State 
Department officials did just that, advising American consuls residing in Europe to work 
for a prohibition of the trade in inland passage tickets. The diplomatic effort involved is 
evidence of a projection of federal authority over US immigration to its European origin
28 Gates, The Illinois Central Railroad, 189; Malmborg to D.A. Neal, May 28, 1854 in 
A.A. Stromberg, ed., “Letters of an Early Emigrant Agent in the Scandinavian Countries,” 
Swedish-American Historical Bulletin 3, no. 2 (June 1930): 9-12.
29 Gates, The Illinois Central Railroad, 192.
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points not unlike what Aristide R. Zolberg has in mind with his theorization of “remote 
control.” This “amounted to a projection of the country of destination’s borders into the 
world at large” and “it was most effective when border-crossing took place at sea, since 
ships constitute containers [that] can be supervised.”30 Taken as a whole, the processes 
and outcomes of the inland passage ticket issue add up to an instance of explicit federal 
involvement in the managing of immigration years before the standard dating of a formal, 
comprehensive national policy on the subject.
A broader domestic context must be established before broaching the subject of 
federal involvement in the issue of inland passage ticket sales. It involves multiple groups 
and locales: emigrant runners who plied their sly trade on the docks of New York and 
ships in its harbor, the Commissioners of Emigration of the State of New York who 
attempted to curtail such practices by establishing a formal emigrant landing depot, and, 
of course, the immigrants themselves.
During the latter half of the 1840s through the middle of the next decade, 
European migrants who came to New York were largely left to their own devices during 
the process of disembarkation and stepping onto United States soil. Ships disgorged their 
passengers, with the transplants having to navigate their new circumstances in unfamiliar 
surroundings without formal guidance. This lack of oversight by any party interested in
30 Aristide R. Zolberg, “Managing a World on the Move,” Population and Development 
Review 32 no. SI (December 2006): 224. For more on this concept, see “The Archeology 
of ‘Remote Control,’” in Migration Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution 
o f State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the 
Inter-War Period, eds., Andreas Fahrmeir, Olivier Faron, and Patrick Weil (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2003), 195-222 and Zolberg, “The Great Wall Against China: 
Responses to the First Immigration Crisis, 1885-1925,” in Migration, Migration History, 
History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives, eds. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 308.
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the welfare of immigrants left a situation ripe for exploitation, one many rather devious 
characters capitalized on. An “expatriated Irish cotter” or other recent arrival, Harper’s 
Weekly reported in 1858, could easily become “prey to the first ensnarer he meets,” ready 
to take advantage. Persons so inclined gathered on the docks, eyeing up potential 
targets.31 Scholars have written a great deal about transatlantic migrants and their 
subsequent lives in the United States, but not about the other person who took part in this 
encounter: the “ensnarer.” Who was he? What did he do, and how did he accomplish 
these things? The answers to these questions start to explain the impetus for the United 
States government intervening in the sale of inland passage tickets in Europe.
The language used in newspapers and periodicals to describe those whose work 
centered on the defrauding of recent arrivals sheds light on how much of the wider public 
regarded them. Dailies did not hold back in their negative descriptions, variously calling 
them “agents,” “runners,” or “swindlers.”32 The Albany Journal spoke of “legions of 
positive harpies” which enveloped the immigrant in a swarm of deceit and trickery. 
Harper’s Weekly called the runners “human vultures.” The opinions were unequivocal: 
such men were “scoundrels of the very lowest calibre.”33 These sorts of judgments 
worked their way across the Atlantic into English and Irish papers as well, where the 
ominous term “man-catcher” gained traction in describing these individuals.34 Such men
31 “Emigrants,” Harper’s Weekly, June 28, 1858. The article looks back on earlier years, 
with an accompanying image entitled “Runners of the Olden Days.”
32 These terms will be used from this point forward without clutter-inducing scare quotes.
33 Albany Journal, December 1, 1855; “Emigrants,” Harper’s Weekly, June 28, 1858.
34 This term’s similarity to “slave-catcher” is most likely more than coincidental as it 
connotes a similar level of venom as was directed by anti-slavery advocates towards 
individuals who worked in service of the strengthened Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. For a 
few representative examples, see “Fugitive Slave Bill,” The Liberator, September 20,
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possessed “unblushing villainy” in pursuing the financial exploitation of migrants. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that numbers of persons, when faced with having to “run the 
gauntlet through scores of designing and unscrupulous ‘man-catchers,’” succumbed to 
nefarious machinations upon arriving at the United States’ doorstep.35
The forms taken were varied, and often a runner was but a single part of a much
larger scheme of immigrant fraud. New York’s Commissioners of Emigration reported
that this “regular and systematic course of deception” was “continually in operation,” and
involved a web of individuals conducting a shady business.36 The “ensnarers” truly lived
up to their moniker, commonly serving as a first point of contact once migrants stepped
on the docks, drawing in targets and trapping them in gossamers of chicanery. However,
the goal of the frauds remained the same regardless of the means employed: profiting
from recent arrivals’ misfortune and (in many instances) ignorance. A single instance is
emblematic of the scope of these systems, as well as how they played out on the ground:
As soon as a ship, loaded with these emigrants, reaches our shores, it is 
boarded by a class of men called runners, either in the employment of 
boarding-house keepers or forwarding establishments, soliciting custom 
for their employers. In order the more successfully to enable the latter to 
gain the confidence of the emigrant, they usually employ those who can 
speak the same language of the emigrant. If they cannot succeed in any 
other way in getting possession and control over the object of their prey, 
they proceed to take charge of [the immigrant’s] luggage, and take it to 
some boarding-house for safe keeping, generally under the assurance that
1850; “Served Him Right,” Frederick Douglass’ Paper, October 28, 1853; “Anti-Slave- 
Catchers’ Mass Convention,” Milwaukee Daily Sentinel, April 10, 1854.
35 “To Irish Farmers and Others Intending to Emigrate to the United States of America,” 
Freeman’s Journal, and Daily Commercial Advertiser, December 24, 1849; “The Tide of 
Emigration to the United States and to the British Colonies," Illustrated London News, 
July 6, 1850.
36 “First Annual Report: From May 5, to December 31, 1847,” Annual Reports o f the 
Commissioners o f Emigration o f the State o f New York, from the Organization o f the 
Commission, May 5, 1847, to 1860 (New York: n. p., 1861), 6.
14
they will charge nothing for carriage-hire or storage. In this way they are 
induced to go to some emigrant boarding-house, of which there are a great
■37
many in the city.
As shown, the emigrant agent was a cog in a machine that usually led back to lodgings, 
the proprietor of which also looked to make a quick profit from migrants. The system 
was mutually beneficial—the innkeeper profited from the rates for room and board paid 
by those brought in by the runner who, in turn, received a kickback in the form of a 
commission. Because attracting larger numbers of migrants meant a larger payday, 
gaining the trust of those brought to boarding houses in the city was absolutely critical. 
To do so meant “all sorts of falsehoods [were] resorted to mislead and deceive the 
emigrant” as to the cost of conveying luggage, as well as to what awaited he or she 
upon reaching the lodgings that runners so earnestly advertised. The Committee of 
Investigation of Legislature, reporting on this system in 1847, was “shocked to find that 
a large portion the frauds committed upon these innocent and, in many cases, ignorant 
foreigners are committed by their own countrymen who have come here before them; 
for we find the German preying upon the German, the Irish upon the Irish, the English 
upon the English, etc.”38 Who could fault a migrant for accepting such supposed 
assistance, especially when the person offering aid was a native of the land so recently 
left behind?
37 “Report of the Committee of the Investigation of the Legislature, 1847” quoted in 
Friedrich Kapp, Immigration, and the Commissioners o f Emigration o f the State o f New 
York (New York: The Nation Press, 1870), 62. Some runners illegally obtained licenses 
to be able to board the ships under the pretense of being an inspector from a customs 
house, and then went to work persuading emigrants to accept their services. Kapp, 
Immigration, and the Commissioners o f Emigration, 63.
38 Quoted in Kapp, Immigration, and the Commissioners o f Emigration, 63.
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Circumstances did not improve upon reaching accommodations. R. Schoyer, 
president of the Netherlands Emigrant Society, asserted that keepers of boarding houses 
charged prices for meals and lodging that were often double those advertised by runners. 
The power to do so can be traced back to the initial interaction on the emigrant boat. 
Runners, after attracting their “customers,” took their baggage and carried it to their 
destination as part of the offered service. By the time migrants had to settle up, these 
possessions were in the hands of the building’s owner. The negotiation that followed 
was simple: acquiesce to the fees or one’s belongings remained with the inn. Certain 
parallels can be drawn between the webs of fraud that these runners were a part of and 
systems which began later in the nineteenth century (in this instance, of coerced labor)
I Q
headed by padrones. The image of the migrant coming to the United States in the 
depths of destitution is a familiar one. That of the migrant who arrived with basic 
means but found themselves out on the streets of New York after falling victim to a 
series of frauds is less known, but no less significant.40 In the mid-1850s, New York 
immigration officials began to take notice of such occurrences, and set in motion a plan
39 Testimony of R. Schoyer: Kapp, Immigration, and the Commissioners o f Emigration, 
64; Padrone has a variety of suitable English translations, but all relate to a figure of 
authority: “master,” “owner,” “boss,” or “chief.” On this system of labor recruitment, see 
Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the North 
American West, 1880-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and “The 
Sacrifice of Golden Boys and Girls: The Padrone System and New Jersey Agriculture” in 
Cindy Hahamovitch, The Fruits o f their Labor: Atlantic Coast Farmworkers and the 
Making o f Migrant Poverty, 1870-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1997).
40 For representative examples of the popular image of the destitute immigrant, see “Lo! 
The Poor Immigrant!,” Milwaukee Sentinel and Gazette, July 7, 1849; “Irish Pauper 
Migration,” Daily Evening Transcript, November 6, 1847.
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to ameliorate the condition of recently arrived European migrants by curtailing the 
practices of emigrant agents.
The extent of mid-nineteenth century European immigration to the United 
States made it impossible for political leaders at all levels to ignore it. During an 1854 
debate on applying a proposed Homestead Act to immigrants, Senator William H. 
Seward argued that “the ingress of the foreign population into this country is a fixed 
and unchangeable fact...nothing could prevent the exodus of the population from 
Ireland when they were besieged in their native homes by famine and pestilence...So it 
is of parts of the population of Germany and continental Europe which come here... it 
cannot remain at home; it must come here.”41 The need for oversight became apparent 
when those with outlooks similar to Seward’s considered the trials endured by recent 
European arrivals. In an effort to put such supervision in place, an act of the New York 
legislature in April of 1855 granted the Commissioners of Emigration—an advisory 
board created in 1847 to investigate and assess the state of immigration to New York— 
the ability to establish a centralized and formal location for migrant landings. The 
Emigrant Landing Depot, colloquially known as Castle Garden, opened the following 
August42 A New York Times article announcing the event gave a nod to the location’s 
past as a popular ampitheatre, but found its new purpose to be of a higher order, one
41 John C. Rives, Congressional Globe 28, pt. 3, July 12, 1854. Quoted in George J. 
Svedja, Castle Garden as an Emigrant Depot, 1855-1890 (Office of Archeology and 
Historic Preservation, National Park Service, 1968), 34.
42 First Annual Report,” Annual Reports o f the Commissioners o f Emigration, 3; “Ninth 
Annual Report for the Year 1855,” Annual Reports o f the Commissioners o f Emigration, 
185-86.
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which would benefit “Humanity.”43 In the protections it offered from practitioners of 
fraud, the Jamestown Journal found much to recommend about the depot, especially 
considering the vulnerability of migrants prior to its establishment. “Vessels loaded 
with Immigrants, after leaving Quarantine, proceed immediately to Castle Garden, 
where the passengers are discharged into the building; and as immigrant runners are not 
allowed to board the ships nor enter Castle Garden, the immigrants are entirely secure 
from the rascalities of these harpies.”44 Illustrations of the depot reinforced this image, 
portraying a safe, orderly, and welcoming location.45
It was the state of New York that undertook the above endeavors to protect 
European immigrants. This fits in with the prevailing scholarly assessment of 
governmental involvement in migration management at this time. And by all accounts, 
the establishment of Castle Garden as a formal emigrant depot succeeded in protecting 
arrivals from the frauds they would have been susceptible to in the preceding years. The 
emigrant agent was effectively cut off from his traditional manner of conducting 
operations. However, as so often happens when officials erect barriers to illicit activity, 
those involved in unlawful practices merely work to find a way around such 
obstructions.
In late January 1857 Franklin Pierce’s Secretary of State William L. Marcy sent a 
circular to United States consuls working in Europe. In it he stated “the attention of this 
department having been recently called to the abuses to which emigrants are subjected in
43 New York Times, August 1, 1855.
44 Jamestown Journal, August 10,1855.
45 “State Emigrant Landing Depot, Castle Garden, N.Y.” in Kapp, Immigration, and the 
Commissioners o f Emigration, plate between 108 and 109; additional images under same 
title via New York Public Library Digital Gallery.
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the countries from which they proceed...it has been deemed advisable to bring the
subject to your notice.” Attached was a letter from Gulian Crommelin Verplanck,
president of the Commissioners of Emigration, which described the alleged ill treatment.
Verplanck also proposed, in Marcy’s words, “a mode of correcting the existing evils”—
the proposition being to ban the inland passage ticket trade. The leader of the State
Department continued, directing American diplomats in Europe to
bring this subject...to the notice of the government to which you are 
accredited, or of the authorities of the place where you reside, and to ask 
for the adoption of such measures on their part as may be considered 
necessary for the protection of those intending to emigrate to this country.
A step in this direction would no doubt be a service in correcting the evils 
complained of, and a regard for the interests of humanity demands that it 
should be taken.46
The circular began a correspondence that lasted almost a year, with communications 
traveling between the United States and various stations in Europe, as the State 
Department’s emissaries engaged in a vigorous and determined diplomacy across the 
Continent, seeking to convince several governments that complying with American 
desires in managing immigration was in their best interest.
It was no coincidence that the language of the above communique was similar to 
that used in describing the frauds practiced by emigrant agents on the docks of New York 
prior to the establishment of Castle Garden. Such deceptions may have been curtailed at
46 “Circular No. 17,” Inland Passage Tickets, 3. The Senate Resolution, put forth by 
Republican Preston King from New York, reads: “Mr. KING submitted the following 
resolution; which was considered by unanimous consent, and agreed to:
Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to furnish, if not 
incompatible with the public interest, copies of the correspondence with, and dispatches 
from, our Ministers at the Courts of England, France, Switzerland, and other Powers, on 
the subject of the dangers to emigrants arising from the practice of contracting with 
irresponsible parties in Europe for American inland passage tickets.” Congressional 
Globe,35th Cong., 1st Sess., [January 7, 1858] (Washington, D.C.: John C. Rives), 215.
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that locale, but they had not been eliminated outright. The origin point of these systems 
of criminal deceit underwent a transatlantic shift, as runners were unable to reach targets 
aboard arriving ships or on shore. The fears of Verplanck and other members of the 
Commission “that the seat of depredation on the emigrant would be changed from this 
port to the ports of embarkation, [had] been more than realized.”47 The object of this fear 
was the inland passage ticket, and more specifically, its sale in Europe to individuals 
looking to take up residence in the United States.
The appeal of the (legitimate) inland passage ticket was in its simplicity, and as 
seen in an earlier discussion, state governments and private railroad companies could 
leverage it in their efforts to induce settlement on their respective lands. To begin the 
process that would bring aspiring emigrants to places such as Michigan or Illinois, they 
would sign on with an agent in Europe that offered, with this single voucher, 
arrangements for the individual’s entire journey. First there was the voyage across the 
ocean. Upon reaching the United States, the migrant would present the ticket to someone 
working in connection with that agent, who would provide transport for both the person 
and whatever belongings they had by rail, canal, or a combination of the two, to their 
desired destination. The inland passage ticket must have seemed ideal, and it was when 
the seller was genuine. Contract with a single company, and one’s transoceanic trek and 
beyond was arranged and taken care of. Little did migrants know, many with less 
benevolent motives saw in the inland passage ticket system an opportunity to establish a 
lucrative racket, latching onto a legitimate trade and operating under its auspices.
47 Verplanck to Marcy, January 23, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 3.
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This ticket served as a medium for multiple deceptions. Agents who sold the 
vouchers commonly charged prices well above market value. Consider how simple it 
could be to take advantage in this way of a relatively isolated village’s population looking 
to emigrate. The more harmful possibility was that the ticket itself was not genuine. In 
that case, the consequences could be dire. A hypothetical account tells a vivid, if 
distressing, story:
The emigrant is shown a neatly printed ticket, with a picture of a 
steamboat, railroad-cars, and canal-packet, with three horses attached to it, 
and is given to understand that such a ticket will take him to a given place 
beyond Albany in a specified manner...and after disposing of the ticket 
for an exorbitant price, the emigrant is furnished with a steamboat ticket to 
take him to Albany, where he is to present this passage-ticket to some 
person or company upon which it is drawn, where it is often either 
protested, or objections taken to the mode of conveyance; and the 
passenger...is often known to complain—when the only evidence he can 
furnish of the fraud committed upon him is to exhibit his ticket with a
A O
picture of three horses, while the line boats are only drawn by two.
Such were the effects on migrants of inland passage tickets’ sale in Europe. After often 
paying a sizeable sum, they could be left with an invalid paper scrap.
Ironically, the success of Castle Garden in curtailing migrant fraud on New York 
shores in many ways created the inland passage ticket issue. Two years before Marcy 
issued his circular No. 17, Verplanck had written him to express pride in the “satisfactory 
character” of the structures and methods in place at the emigrant landing depot, saying it 
did much “to increase [immigrants’] comforts whilst here,” and stating that it was “also 
highly advantageous to their health.”49 Such language speaks to the deeper claim that 
Verplanck wished to make: these improvements in migrants’ experiences had their
48 Theodore S. Fay to Swiss Federal Council, February 19, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 
13; Kapp, Immigration, and the Commissioners o f Emigration, 68.
49 Verplanck to Marcy, October 12, 1855, Inland Passage Tickets, 5.
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origins in the commissioners’ ability to separate emigrant agents from their intended 
marks. Castle Garden had fulfilled its purpose. But the commissioners soon realized that 
instead of the frauds being completely eliminated, they had merely shifted bases of 
operations.
An American diplomat serving in Switzerland encapsulated the situation when he 
said, “The swindlers, who have found their artifices cut short by the efficient proceedings 
of the American authorities, have transferred the seat of their operations to Europe.”50 
The systems of migrant fraud had now taken on the shape of a hydra: cutting off 
chicanery in New York led to snake heads rising in various European locales. Indeed, the 
diffuse, decentralized nature of the European situation made combatting this threat to 
migrants all the more difficult. Verplanck noted the scope of the enterprise when he 
remarked “the chief operators of fraud have not only opened offices in the several 
seaports where emigrants to this country usually embark, but have also established 
agencies in the very villages whence families are likely to emigrate.” He saw the latter as 
more ominous, saying it was in these “more remote” locations that “the 
greater.. .opportunity for imposition and fraud” presented itself.51
The essence of the fraudulent inland passage ticket system was that it kept 
migrants away from any formal oversight, hence Verplanck’s apprehension about their 
sale in secluded European villages and towns. This avoidance of authority continued once 
in the United States, with those who purchased inland passage tickets at their point of 
origin having little reason to remain in Castle Garden or make use of its services.
50 Theodore S. Fay to Swiss Federal Council, February 19, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 
13.
51 Verplanck to Marcy, January 23, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 3-4.
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According to a chronicler of the Commissioners of Emigration immigration at Castle 
Garden, the depot had fourteen discrete departments providing assistance to those 
arriving in New York. Employees offered help by writing letters to acquaintances still in 
Europe, managing remittances forwarded to immigrants, and operating a labor exchange 
where new arrivals could look for employment, just to name a few.52 Another major 
component of their services was the authorized sale of passage tickets to points west of 
New York City. The Commissioners of Emigration “induced the directors of the principal 
railroad and steamboat lines to the West to organize at Castle Garden a central and joint 
ticket office for the sale—at the regular published prices—of passage tickets for 
emigrants to their several places of destination in the interior, and, to place such office, 
and the entire business of forwarding persons or property, under their own immediate 
supervision.”53 All of Castle Garden’s intended protections are visible in this single 
instance. The basic physical security of the location, the transparent and fair assistance on 
offer, and the formal oversight of the process all aided the immigrant. However, this was 
all for naught if an individual had already purchased an inland passage ticket in Europe. 
If so, migrants were soon outside the secure confines of the depot, with the all 
potentialities of their immediate future contained in a small and potentially worthless 
paper voucher.
Upon becoming aware of the ramifications of fraudulent inland passage tickets 
and their origins in Europe, the United States government intervened in managing 
international migration, setting in motion one of the fits and starts that took place as the
52 Kapp, Immigration, and the Commissioners o f Emigration, 111-24.
53 Kapp, Immigration, and the Commissioners o f Emigration, 205.
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crafting and setting of US immigration policy became a fully federal issue. The initiation 
came through diplomatic correspondence, put into practice by American consuls in 
residence on the Continent working for a solution. The consuls were the key to the whole 
process. Having “boots on the ground” petitioning European governmental officials 
proved to be an effective mechanism for bringing about the desired change. Some 
diplomats went beyond this, bringing their message straight to the populace by placing 
ads and editorials in local newspapers. One even engaged in a heated exchange via the 
press with an oppositional group, as will be seen. All this done was for desired federal 
control of immigration in this instance.
From the beginning of his correspondence with Secretary of State Marcy, 
Verplanck had called for a total prohibition of the inland passage ticket trade, as the 
vouchers were the root of the issue.54 One should recall that not all were fraudulent, as 
legitimate stateside entities engaged in their sale abroad. And yet, there was no plausible 
manner in which to separate the fake from the genuine article—doing away with the trade 
in its entirety was the only way forward. US officials quickly adopted the outlook that 
enacting a complete ban was the best way to dismantle prevailing systems of fraud and 
protect migrants from further potential victimization. In communicating the desired plan 
of action to European governments, American consuls used concise and direct language. 
There was to be no misunderstanding the objective of this exercise. Theodore S. Fay’s 
address to the Federal Council of Switzerland exemplifies these qualities. After stating 
his government’s position on the issue, he clarified to maximum effect, writing, “every
54 Verplanck to Marcy, January 23, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 3.
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European emigrant agent should be forbidden to sell in Europe any ticket, or make any 
contract, for inland American carriage or transportation.”55
As mentioned above, communications from Verplanck to Secretary of State 
Marcy served as stimulus for the involvement of the state in pushing for a ban. Indeed, 
the commissioner was sure that the severity and scope of the problem demanded federal 
action to enact change. In one of his several letters to Marcy he wrote, “the claims of 
humanity and justice, and the comity of nations, require and authorize our government to 
invoke the aid of other governments in protecting their own subjects during their 
pilgrimage.” United Sates diplomats sounded this claim for the necessity of governmental 
action often throughout their correspondence. Officials of several European governments 
concurred with this assessment of the situation, using language that acknowledged the 
importance placed by the United States on rectifying the problematic ticket trade.56
Underlying the push for US federal involvement in managing immigration was a 
feeling that migrants’ influences on their destination country were too tremendous not to 
be influenced and administered by the national government. The European arrivals in 
question during this period could be a tremendous boon to the country’s labor force, but 
allowing the frauds associated with inland passage tickets had the potential—in both the 
short and long term—to disrupt any societal benefits that the introduction of additional 
population might have. Fay articulated such sentiments, seeing the immigration taking
55 Theodore S. Fay to Swiss Federal Council, February 19, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 
13. Italics in the original.
r / '
Verplanck to Marcy, January 23, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 4. For other examples 
on the US side, see Fay to Federal Council, June 8, 1857, 22; John Y. Mason to Lewis 
Cass, August 15, 1857 on his “executing the wishes of the President,”, 55. On the 
European side see, “Circular, Swiss Federal Council to all the confederated States,” June 
13, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 46, 49.
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place as “one of the most important interests of modem time,” and believing that “a crisis 
in human history is silently changing the face of the world, involving the most weighty 
questions connected with pauperism, capital, labor, and human happiness.” He continued 
by saying that despite international migration affecting each of these significant subjects, 
it “has received from governments only partial attention, and has never become the 
subject of any legislative or treaty stipulations tending to establish one general system for 
the promotion.. .of the mutual interest of the emigrant himself, the country from which he 
issues, and that to which he proceeds.”57 The banning of the sale of inland passage tickets 
in Europe can be seen as a step towards a “general system” that Fay bemoaned the lack 
of.58 While the international correspondence that constitutes the main source base for this 
project highlights the consular diplomacy undertaken in only in several select countries, it 
should be remembered that Secretary of State Marcy’s Circular No. 17 was sent to all 
United States emissaries serving on the Continent, and thus it is reasonable to believe 
envoys in other European nations similarly conducted themselves.59 On the issue of the 
sale of inland passage tickets, there would be no formal legislation or treaties, but the 
diplomatic efforts expended by the American state to enact the trade’s prohibition is 
evidence of clear and direct federal involvement in managing immigration.
57 Fay to Swiss Federal Council, February 19, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 12. Italics in 
the original.
58 Indeed this want of a “general system” could be read as a desire for more formal 
federal authority over immigration, and he himself would become an example of the 
capacity to enact change in that arena at the federal level.
59 To reiterate, the correspondence covers the nations of Great Britain (including Ireland), 
France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. This may be because these were the major 
migrant-sending countries during the mid-nineteenth century, but given the wide 
audience of the circular, the state department seemed to be making a systematic effort at 
enforcing a ban.
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American officials now had a plan: to work for a prohibition of inland passage 
ticket sales on the Continent. However, the diplomats realized that the enactment of this 
plan could not be done unilaterally. It relied heavily on European enforcement. To help in 
achieving this end, United States consuls, when communicating with their assigned 
governments, consciously stressed the theme of international cooperation to solve a 
mutually affecting issue. In Switzerland, Fay expressed confidence “that the high federal 
council” would “continue to lend its able co-operation.” Minister to France John Young 
Mason had “received instructions to ask the co-operation of the Emperor’s government in 
uprooting the abuse” of inland passage voucher sales “so far as it may exist in” that 
country. Later in the same communication he reinforced his government’s petition, as he 
wished “to invoke the earnest attention of the Emperor’s government...and express the 
hope that measures will be immediately taken to suppress legally” the trade in tickets.60
Those advocating for prohibition usually couched it in terms of benevolence and 
humanitarianism. Writing to the minister of foreign affairs in France, Mason spoke of 
“benevolent individuals” who “illustrated the Christian virtue of charity by devoting 
themselves to the investigation and removal of these monstrous abuses as they have 
existed in America.”61 He wished to draw a parallel between the successes of Castle 
Garden and the enactment of a ban on the sale of inland passage tickets, as he believed 
the results would be the same. European officials used similar language, signaling 
agreement about the importance of the enterprise before them. Early on in its
60 Fay to the Federal Council, June 8, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 22; Fay had earlier 
“received from his government instructions to solicit” such collaboration, Fay to Swiss 
Federal Council, February 19, 1857, 13; Mason to Walewski, June 23, 1857, 57.
61 Federal Council to Fay, March 2, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 22; Mason to 
Walewski, June 23, 1857, 56.
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correspondence, the Swiss Federal Council recognized “the noble object which lies at the 
foundation” of asking for prohibition.
US officials’ insistence on this issue could not have been any clearer: “the best 
way for the immigrant is—To buy no inland ticket in Switzerland or Europe, but to pay 
his passage only to New York city,” and “to land at Castle Garden.”62 But all this 
diplomatic wrangling and general state involvement would be for naught if the trade’s 
prohibition could not be brought about. There were some expressions of early skepticism 
about the necessity of a ban. Alexander Herbemont, United States consul in Genoa, 
reported to Secretary of State Lewis Cass that he had done his due diligence in alerting 
“the chief authorities of this city,” to the problems associated with the voucher trade, but 
he was unsure “whether it will do much good” where he was in residence. This was not 
due to the absence of frauds in Genoa, but because “the people here seem to feel no 
sympathy for those who emigrate—the great object (with the authorities at least) being to 
get rid of as many useless characters as possible.”63 This provides a view into the darker 
side of pro-emigration sentiment perhaps, but such feelings were isolated. London-based 
diplomat Robert B. Campbell had a more pragmatic edge to his skepticism, believing a 
prohibition to be “so much at the variance with the practice of issuing through tickets, so 
universally prevailing in England and on the continent, that I fear it will be difficult to 
induce the governments of Europe to abolish this practice.”64
62 “Warning to North American emigrants by New York,” Inland Passage Tickets, 24.
63 Cass took office on March 6, 1857, replacing Marcy. Herbemont to Cass, March 27, 
1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 18.
64 Campbell to Marcy, February 17, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 9.
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American officials met these expressions of uncertainty about the effect of 
banning inland passage tickets by citing the cities—most often Bremen and Hamburg— 
where a prohibition was already in place. In one of his early letters, Verplanck had 
remarked “there is a marked contrast in passengers coming by way of Hamburg and 
Bremen and those by other European ports. It rarely occurs that passengers from either 
Hamburg or Bremen are unable, on their arrival here, to pay their way to their destination 
in the interior, or to secure all proper comforts and conveniences on the way.”65 When the 
banning of inland passage ticket sales was shown to be beneficial to the emigrant, 
European officials would be hard pressed to oppose such measures as pushed for by the 
US state. In this vein, consuls cast Bremen and Hamburg as guiding lights for other 
Continental locations to follow. These locales, “in doing away with this abuse, by legally 
breaking it up, have, in the interest of the emigrant, set a good example to other European 
states.”66 Other German cities which had also already enforced prohibition expressed 
appreciation and support for the actions taken by the United States. A minister based in 
Darmstadt “was pleased to see...the needful regulations on the part of the United States 
government for the protection of the German emigrants.”67 Borne by US diplomacy, this 
idea for managing international migration gained traction.
In multiple European locales, ousting the sale of inland passage tickets came with 
little difficulty. Correspondence with the US minister in London led Lord Clarendon,
65 Verplanck to Marcy, January 23, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 4.
66 The Federal Council to Fay, March 2, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 14-15; The 
Council referred to Fay’s assertion that, due to their banning of the vouchers, Hamburg 
and Bremen “are to be preferred by the emigrant before all others,” Fay to the Federal 
Council, February 19, 1857, 13. For other mentions of these two cities, see 4, 12.
67 Multiple letters, Inland Passage Tickets, 19-21; Quote: J. V. Dalwight to Samuel 
Ricker, May 4, 1857, 20.
29
Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to sanction official action to counter the 
trade in the spring of 1857. This included the authorizing of police forces to work against 
its continuation in Ireland. Warnings about the “great frauds having been committed on 
passengers...by the sale, in this country, of ‘inland passage tickets’” found their way into 
British newspapers as well.68 That summer, Frankfurt joined the ranks of German cities 
enacting bans, while the town of Lubeck also took concrete strides against the trade, 
echoing British officials’ use of law enforcement officers to warn its populace against the 
purchase of these tickets, as well as putting constabularies on the lookout for agencies 
continuing to offer them, in which case “a special prohibition in this respect should be 
deemed advisable.”69 The French government endorsed the idea as well. Having already 
put a ban on “tickets entitling the holder to a passage from France to California” 
specifically, a general prohibition was in the works, especially “in view of the abuses 
which had been pointed out.”70 The exercise of US statecraft proved to be quite effective 
in bringing about preferred outcomes in managing immigration.
The road to prohibition was not as smooth elsewhere. Similar endeavors in 
Switzerland met dogged resistance, forcing United States diplomats in residence there to 
redouble their efforts. In the face of correspondence between Theodore S. Fay and the 
Federal Council, immigration offices that sold inland passage tickets were openly 
carrying on doing so. What is more, agencies working out of Basel and St. Gall—cities in 
the extreme north and northeastern parts of Switzerland respectively—put an
68 Multiple letters, February 21 to March 26, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 15-17; 
“Summary,” Caledonian Mercury, April 17, 1857.
69 Samuel Ricker to Cass, July 3, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 29; P.L. Edler to Ricker, 
July 17, 1857, 40. Italics in original.
70 Walewski to Mason, July 6, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 58.
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advertisement in the “demi-official” paper Der Bund [The Union], which, in Fay’s 
estimation, stated that these firms would “continue to forward emigrants by New 
York... to the interior o f the United States o f America” The diplomat was understandably 
dissatisfied with this turn of events—the move to continue the trade ran counter to all his 
efforts to this point—and he said as much to Secretary of State Lewis Cass. It was 
“notwithstanding... the substance of my note of February 19, a copy of which...had been 
published by the federal government in the ‘Feuille Federate [Federal Gazette],’ their 
official sheet, and been copied, I believe, into all the Swiss newspapers, and 
notwithstanding the circular upon the subject issued, in consequence of my note, by the 
federal council to the cantonal governments.” If he was to finish the assignment set 
before him by his government, further action was required. Fay rightly “thought a more 
energetic step necessary, and therefore caused to be inserted in the ‘Bund’ newspaper [a]
71‘warning’ to emigrants.” He decided to do so after perceiving a lack of action on the 
part of the Swiss Federal Council to work towards a prohibition. An additional 
communication reiterated the United States government’s position on the issue and asked
72for the council’s “renewed attention.” Their response complicated how Fay had planned 
to achieve his government’s wishes, but it also opened an alternate path for realizing his 
objective.
71 Fay to Cass, June 11, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 21. Italics in original; text of ad in 
Der Bund, 24-25; the “note of February 19” refers to Fay’s communication to the Swiss 
Federal Council regarding frauds connected to the sale of inland passage tickets and his 
government’s belief in the necessity of its prohibition. Inland Passage Tickets, 12-14; 
Fay’s warning, 23-24.
72 Fay to the Federal Council, June 10, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 23.
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The council replied that “the emigration business does not, constitutionally, come 
within the official range of the federal authorities...it rather belongs to the cantonal 
governments to watch over this movement of the public life, and to protect it, as far as 
possible, from abuses.” Therefore, while the council had already “express[ed] the 
expectation that the governments will adopt the requisite measures to arrest this 
pernicious and ruinous conduct of the agents for the future,” that was the extent of its
n ' i
capabilities. Fay now had to consider how best to exert influence on the issue of inland 
passage ticket sales at a national level, as entreaties to the Swiss federal government were 
not having the necessary impact. Fay’s ensuing struggle for coverage in Der Bund and 
Feuille Federate set a precedent. Winning a battle for positive press on prohibition 
presented an excellent avenue to exert leverage on the issue. It was a perceptive insight.74 
Fay now looked to sway public opinion so as to force action by the cantonal governments.
A periodical titled Der Kolonist, described as “the organ for Swiss emigrants,” set 
a debate in motion. An article published in late June of 1857 laid out twelve reasons 
advising against immigration to New York and, most importantly, through Castle Garden. 
While the authors did not directly oppose a ban on inland passage ticket sales in Europe, 
their campaigning against New York’s emigrant landing station could incline migrants to 
choose to buy such a ticket, hoping to avoid the alleged ills of Castle Garden. Fay hoped
73 The Federal Council to Fay, June 13, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 25-26. These 
quotes show that, similar to the US at this time, Swiss control over immigration policy 
was of a decentralized nature.
74 As Benedict Anderson has shown how an imagined, shared identity can be engendered 
through the “mass ceremony” of individuals reading newspapers in a shared “print 
language,” newspapers can hold immense power in the shaping of ideas in a national 
context. Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), 35.
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to snuff out this line of thinking. The article’s main thrust was that Castle Garden was 
controlled not by the Commissioners of Emigration, but by private railroad companies 
that provided the service of conducting arrivals to points inland. It alleged that a “most 
flagitious monopoly”—complete with the charging of exorbitant prices for the offered 
railroad travel—was in place at Castle Garden, one sanctioned by the commissioners.75 
Thus, a ban on inland passage tickets would funnel all immigrants through Castle Garden, 
securing sizable business for the railroad firms conducting business there. What is more, 
the article claimed these same companies were the ones conducting the trade in inland 
passage tickets on the Continent: “the ‘booking’ in Europe—which the commissioners 
have represented...as highly injurious—is carried on as extensively...by both of the
*7( \Castle Garden monopolizing railroad companies.” Having worked so diligently to 
bring about a prohibition of this ticket trade and enact the wishes of his government, Fay 
did not let the piece in the Kolonist deter his efforts, and instead set out to refute its 
allegations.
In a lengthy letter to the Federal Council after the publishing of the Kolonist piece, 
Fay spoke in disbelieving terms of how it seemed “clear that [the Kolonist's\ 
proceedings...are calculated to inflict an injury upon the emigrant.”77 In order to mitigate 
such harm and eliminate the potential for any in the future, he took to disproving the 
claims one by one. Beyond pointing to a general lack of hard evidence to accompany 
several of the Kolonist's assertions, Fay cited an investigation carried out by the county
75 *“Warning to Emigrants who go to North America by Way of New York,” Der Kolonist, 
Inland Passage Tickets, 27-29
76 “Warning,” Kolonist, Inland Passage Tickets, 29.
77 Fay to Federal Council, July 7, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 32.
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of New York in 1856 to assess Castle Garden’s conditions and systems. The report found 
that “the utmost order prevailed throughout,” with “spacious bath-rooms” and rooms fit 
for “promenading.” Overall, “the grand inquest having thus personally witnessed the 
whole mode of doing business at the landing depot of Castle Garden,” they had “become 
satisfied that every care was taken of the emigrants that philanthropy could suggest.” The 
report did mention that the investigatory team had received “complaints against certain 
employes of the railroad companies doing business with the emigrants landing at Castle 
Garden.” Having watched the system in action, however, the county committee 
“dismissed” these allegations, as the investigators were “satisfied that they were not 
sustained by law, and have their origin in a design to disturb, rather than to further, the 
good work” of the emigrant depot.78 As for the Kolonisf s claim that the railroad firms in 
Castle Garden also worked in Europe to sell inland passage tickets, Fay pointed out an 
inherent logical fallacy: “If these railroad companies govern in Castle Garden, and at the 
same time have agents to book in Europe, how is it that Castle Garden [and, by extension, 
the US state] warns emigrants not to book in Europe? The truth appears even from the
79‘Kolonist’s’ objections themselves.” Soon after this communication, the president of the 
council notified Fay that every Swiss canton had positively replied to Fay’s earlier 
entreaties and, in a communication to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, the diplomat said
78 “Before the Recorder,” Inland Passage Tickets, 7, 6, 9; full report is 6-9. A later 
communication from Verplanck mentions “the improvements which have been made 
since the date of this report add so much to the present value of the establishment,” 
Verplanck to Cass, September 3, 1857, 59.
79 Fay to the Federal Council, July 7, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 33.
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the Swiss federal government had given him “the assurance that it would do everything in 
its power to suppress the traffic of American inland passage tickets.”80
Even with this pledge, Fay continued to work for beneficial press coverage, 
penning a second warning for publication in Swiss papers, reiterating the advice against 
purchasing a voucher. He also included a refutation of the Kolonist’s claims, quoting 
verbatim several paragraphs of the 1856 inquest findings.81 Fay worked to disseminate 
this message as widely as possible, knowing this was necessary to obtain the desired level 
of influence. Der Bund published the warning just as it had the first. Copies were sent to 
each of the cantonal governments for posting, as well as to other consuls serving in 
Switzerland, with Fay imploring them “to give it every publicity in your power, as well 
as by communicating it to the emigration offices within your district as to such 
newspapers as may be willing to republish it.”82
The Kolonist, however, had not stopped with a single anti-Castle Garden article, 
publishing later “remarks of the editors” restating their views on why emigrants should 
not travel there. After this, Fay decided to debate his antagonists on their own ground. He 
asked for the publication of his warning in the following issue of the Kolonist, knowing 
that to deny its printing “would have furnished [Fay] a just cause of complaint.” If it was 
included, he was supremely confident that the notice “contained abundant proof that [the 
editors’] paragraph was a calumny against Castle Garden.” The next edition of the 
Kolonist ran with Fay’s warning and no rebuttal of any kind. In a communication to Cass,
80 Fay to Cass, July 17, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 35.
81 “Second warning of the American Legation to emigrants,” Inland Passage Tickets, 36- 
38.
82 Fay to the Federal Council, July 22, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 41; Fay to Consuls, 
41.
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he relayed his success: the Kolonist “was the only voice in Switzerland raised against 
Castle Garden, and I presume it is now silenced.”
Fay’s presumption portended tangible results in Switzerland. Cantons that had not 
acted before now “adopted very stringent measures” against the sale of inland passage 
tickets, as several began to formally prohibit it, including the city of Basel, which Fay— 
perhaps a bit smugly—attributed to his “last summer protestations and public warnings.”
O A
Illegal sales of inland passage tickets brought fines of up to 1,000 francs. With these 
conditions put in place, Fay had achieved the goal set out by his government, effectively 
exerting control over the flow of emigration from Switzerland, just as other consuls 
throughout Europe had done in their countries of residence.
The results achieved by US international diplomacy in regards to the inland 
passage ticket issue exhibits direct and explicit involvement of the federal state in 
managing immigration. True, full federalization of immigration policy began with the 
Page Act in 1875 or the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. But getting there was neither 
inevitable nor simple. The inland passage ticket issue of the mid nineteenth century is a 
signpost along the rocky road towards that point. To ignore the ramifications surrounding 
this moment is to perpetuate a historical blind spot. Perhaps the topic has been largely 
unacknowledged and discounted because there was no codified law, no discrete unit ripe 
for historical exploration. Whatever the reason, the conduct of international diplomacy is 
within the realm of the US federal government and it chose to use its consuls to achieve a 
desired outcome in the management of international migration. As Secretary of State
83 Fay to Cass, September 3, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 43-44.
84 Fay to Cass, December 15, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 63; Federal Council to Fay, 
November 27, 1857, 64; Fay to Cass, November 23, 1857, 63.
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Lewis Cass said near the end of the correspondence regarding the trade in inland passage 
tickets, no one should be mistaken to think that the issue “had not received my 
consideration or that of the President,” and that “we could not fail to concur in any proper 
measures for their suppression.”85 United States diplomats based in Europe had taken that 
message and worked for its fulfillment on the ground.
This highlights the fuzzy manner in which people engage with the concept of 
immigration policy. Even starting with what would seem to be a baseline, i.e., seeing 
immigration as state or federal issue can get messy. As shown above, there is no either/or. 
Both levels of government have been involved and the locus has shifted, moved “up” and 
fallen back “down” over time. To not take such complexity into account is to reify the 
concept of immigration policy. Even when policy-making is done at the federal level, 
which branch does so has differed as well: Congress enacted the slave trade ban, the 
Supreme Court ruled in the Passenger Cases, and the State Department confronted the 
inland passage ticket issue. US immigration policy, like the proverb says of success, has 
had many fathers.
The above exploration of the inland passage ticket situation explains how 
international diplomacy brought about a prohibition of the voucher trade. The why seems 
on the surface to be quite simple: frauds practiced abroad had brought consequences to 
US shores, and this necessitated the swindles’ termination. But employing the State 
Department and its diplomatic corps to do so is not an insubstantial action, as it forged 
another link in the chain of ongoing state formation regarding authority over immigration 
policy. Leaving aside the fact that such exercises of international diplomacy are the clear
85 Cass to Mason, September 29, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 61.
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domain of the State Department, what factors influenced this response to inland passage
ticket rackets, and why did the issue come to a head at this time?
The political, economic, and social environment of the 1850s is sufficiently
complex that it would improbable for there to be a single factor that brought about the
response to inland passage ticket frauds, and it would be equally impossible to isolate it if
that was the case. Instead, this instance of federal involvement in immigration
management lies at the convergence of multiple influences. Full prohibition also rested
86on the cooperation of European governments and thus many interests were in play. 
What follows is a laying out of influences on the response to inland passage ticket fraud.
Perhaps the most obvious factor would be feelings of altruism on the part of the 
Commissioners of Emigration and state department officials sympathetic to the plight of 
swindled immigrants. No doubt the mental or actual image of these individuals stranded 
upon the docks of New York after facing a lengthy transoceanic journey (improvements 
in steamboat travel notwithstanding) pulled at heartstrings, and those with the power to 
enact change saw it as their duty to do so. US officials did foreground humanitarian 
interests in their correspondence with the various Continental polities, as shown in a 
discussion above. Recall as well a statement in one of Gulian C. Verplack’s earlier letters 
to William L. Marcy: “the claims of humanity and justice, and the comity of nations, 
require and authorize our government to invoke the aid of other governments in 
protecting their own subjects during their pilgrimage.”87 While some of this language
86 For examples of this need for European aid in enforcement see above, and also Fay to 
the Federal Council, June 8, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 22; Fay to Swiss Federal 
Council, February 19, 1857, 13; Mason to Walewski, June 23, 1857, 57.
87 Verplanck to Marcy, January 23, 1857, Inland Passage Tickets, 4.
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refers to the necessity of caring for one’s fellow man (“claims of humanity and justice”), 
it is also significant that Verplanck invokes the relevant European governments’ 
responsibility to their subjects. Both choices of words are rooted in maintaining peoples’ 
well-being, but acknowledge a difference in the motivations for doing so. Either way, 
while altruistic statements could be put down to consuls putting their most agreeable foot 
forward when petitioning European governments for what amounted to a diplomatic 
favor, there had to have been at least a grain of true sentiment behind such statements 
from even the most cynical of souls.
The potential for migrants defrauded by illegitimate inland passage ticket sales to 
become public charges also has to be taken into account. The parties in charge of 
providing aid in these cases would have had a vested interest in a prohibition of the trade, 
as it would at least partially reduce their financial outlay in this department. At the time 
of the actions against inland passage ticket fraud, poor relief was predominantly a local
go
responsibility—a carryover from British poor law. The eighteenth-century law in New 
York that required “any persons that cannot give a good Account of themselves to the 
Mayor or like[ly] to be a Burthen” to be denied the ability to land or the payment of a 
bond on their behalf by the ship’s captain would seem to alleviate the problem, but a 
passage voucher’s illegitimacy was most likely discovered after disembarkation. 
Provision of aid for those migrants who fell into abject poverty had to come from the 
locality they found themselves in and from the late eighteenth century onwards, New 
York state disallowed the practice of forcing the removal of foreigners who became 
public charges from their point of arrival on its shores. Networks of alms- and
88 Gabaccia, Foreign Relations, 64.
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workhouses served as the main givers of aid.89 This bundle of issues inspired the passing 
of legislation at the state and local levels attempting to move the financial burden of 
providing for such individuals onto masters of ships, often through the imposition of a 
head tax per immigrant. This process led to the arguing of the Passenger Cases before the 
Supreme Court in the mid-nineteenth century discussed earlier.
Gulian C. Verplanck initiating the conversation that prompted the US diplomatic 
corps to act against inland passage tickets lends credence to the financial burden of local 
responsibility for poor relief being a crucial factor. As the president of the 
Commissioners of Emigration, he oversaw the body concerned with monitoring all facets 
of immigrant-related affairs at the US’s busiest port for international arrivals, not the least 
of which was keeping tabs on the situation of poor aid. What is more, New York chapter 
presidents of German and Irish migrant aid societies had positions on the Commission 
throughout the board’s existence, who no doubt knew the capabilities and status of poor 
relief in the city.90 Seventy-five percent of the nearly four and a quarter million 
immigrants who landed on the country’s shores in the two decades following 1840 did so 
at New York City.91 The amount of money needed would be tremendous if only a very 
small minority of this number required assistance and any added to it due to those 
defrauded by inland passage ticket scams would only exacerbate a potentially serious 
issue. Cutting off this possibility at its source through the power of the federal
89 Klebaner, “State and Local Immigration Regulation in the United States before 1882,” 
292; Neuman, “The Lost Century of American Immigration Law,” 1853-54.
90 See Kapp, Immigration, and the Commissioners o f Emigration, 224-26 for a list of 
commissioners from 1847 to 1870.
91 Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation o f America, 
1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 527.
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government would thus be in aid providers’ interests. Verplanck’s action can be seen as a 
manifestation of their concern.
The general political climate of in the US at the time of the inland passage ticket 
issue should be highlighted as well, as many issues relating to immigrants contributed to 
its contentious nature. The state, local, and federal measures that sought to manage 
immigration that have been outlined here often had an exclusionary slant. The 1850s
09were, after all, the heyday of anti-immigrant nativism. On the other hand, pro- 
immigrationists such as Charles Sumner believed the phenomenon could only bring 
continued benefits to the US, as it had been doing for centuries: “there are our broad 
lands, stretching towards the setting sun; let them come and take them. Ourselves 
children of the Pilgrims of a former generation, let us not turn from the Pilgrims of the 
present...The history of our country, in its humblest and as well as most exalted spheres, 
testifies to the merit of foreigners.” The country’s “broad lands”—added to by territorial 
expansions such as the Louisiana Purchase and land acquisitions after the Mexican- 
American War—that Sumner spoke of drove a desire among many pro-immigrationists
93for quick western settlement and were great incentives for those coming from abroad. 
Nativists feared a deluge of foreigners, whose un-American ways and sentiments would 
adversely impact the country’s social, political, and cultural bases. Debates over how 
western lands should be settled, and by whom, also played into increasing sectional
92 Gabaccia, Foreign Relations, 63-67. For one of the standard texts on nativism, see: 
Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics o f 
the 1850s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Q<3
Charles Sumner, “Political Parties and Our Foreign-Born Population” [1855], quoted in 
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tensions. The violence surrounding the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act and the issue of 
slavery highlights just a single facet of this. The vitriolic atmosphere grew ever more so 
as the decade progressed, and the inland passage ticket issue occurred right in the middle 
of it. The effort to enact a prohibition occupied a somewhat curious position within this 
political climate. The federal measures were pro-immigrant in that they aimed to protect 
European migrants from fraud, but the measures also controlled immigration by cutting 
off one of the legitimate way they could arrive on its shores.
The inland passage ticket issue should also be viewed in light of the Second Party 
System’s collapse and the role of immigrants’ political participation in it. Looking at the 
surge in European migration to the US in the late 1840s and early 1850s—in which 
Famine and post-1848 revolutions movement played no small part—the Whig Party and 
its leaders realized that their ability to compete in national elections could be severely 
threatened due to the immigrant vote usually going Democratic. The US naturalization 
policy of five years’ residence made large numbers of migrants eligible for the 1852 
presidential election, and many individual states allowed noncitizen residents to vote as 
well. Unless something was done to court immigrant ballots, Whig ascension to the 
White House would be an uphill battle. But to do so would be to set the party against 
nativist and anti-Catholic blocs that traditionally formed an important part of Whigs’ 
support base. The party considered its options and the fact that a “tremendous surge in the 
immigrant vote was a virtual certainty” loomed too large to ignore.94 But Whigs’ 
subsequent switch to seeking immigrant support made them a latecomer to the electoral
94 Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis o f the 1850s (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1978), 120-23.
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party: “however understandable, their desperate decision during the 1852 presidential 
campaign to compete with Democrats for Catholic and immigrant votes was a colossal 
blunder. It failed dismally in the short run and permanently alienated an important, 
rapidly growing sector of the anti-Democratic electorate in the long run.” On the back of 
a large majority of the immigrant vote, Democratic candidate Franklin Pierce took his 
position as chief executive. This only marked the beginning of the end for the Whig Party. 
Divided by the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the issue of slavery more generally, the party 
was gone from the US political scene by the 1856 presidential election.95 Regarding the 
inland passage ticket issue, the significance is not in the specifics of the downfall of the 
Whigs. What is significant is that the need for a governmental response arose at a time 
where foreign residents’ place in US politics being under heightened scrutiny. Federal 
efforts to manage immigration in this instance navigated an era where immigrants 
occupied prime space in the collective political and social mind.
A final element that can be woven into why this voucher question arose has to do 
with the importance of controlling transport hubs and lines during this era, especially 
those of railroads. The 1840s and 50s saw an absolute explosion of track laying, with the 
US’s Atlantic coast becoming increasingly connected with more western lands.96 It is 
true that these “railroads had particularly portentous consequences for settlers in the 
newer states of the Old Northwest” wherein the “space-binding technology of the trains 
magnified the opportunities for farmers in those places to ship their crops to distant
95 Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall o f the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics 
and the Onset o f the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 956-57.
96 Allan Pred, Urban Growth and City-Systems in the United States, 1840-1860 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 45-47 has a useful graphical representation 
of this growth.
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destinations, encouraging market production rather than local consumption.”97 But 
providing the service that brought farmers to the inland points they wished to settle and 
work on was a lucrative trade as well.
It should be remembered that one of the major facets in Castle Garden’s efforts to 
aid migrants just off the boat was to provide “a central and joint ticket office for the 
sale—at the regular published prices—of passage tickets for emigrants to their several 
places of destination in the interior, and, to place such office, and the entire business of
98forwarding persons or property, under their own immediate supervision.” On the 
surface, this seems like a measure with only an immigrant’s welfare in mind. And it no 
doubt protected many from the machinations of the runners who had prowled New 
York’s docks. But as shown, the purchase of an inland passage ticket prior to arrival on 
US shores allowed the bypassing of this department entirely, which cut railroad 
companies operating through Castle Garden off from a sizeable number of potential sales. 
Thus, the agitation for a prohibition of European-sold inland passage tickets can also be 
viewed in part as an effort to (re)establish control of migrant transport from New York 
City in the form of a likely railroad monopoly.
97 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 567. Howe also importantly notes: “Railroads did 
indeed have political as well as economic consequences, but they turned out to be 
sectional rather than simply strengthening the Union. Their network reinforced east-west 
ties at the expense of north-south ones. Their resources, added to those of the Erie and 
related canals, further encouraged the Old Northwest to ship its produce eastward rather 
than southward along the river system to the Gulf, affecting the balance of political 
power both regionally and nationally. The geographical competition that the railroads 
stimulated for westward routes, fostered by politicians like Illinois's Stephen Douglas, 
was destined to exacerbate sectional tensions in the years leading up to the Civil War.” 
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Swiss-based US consul Theodore S. Fay denied that exact accusation as part of 
his diplomatic efforts to have a ban on the vouchers enacted, as seen in his debate with 
the Kolonist in the Swiss press. But evidence points in the other direction. At the very 
least, railroad companies became increasingly specialized and sizeable through mergers 
in the years leading up to the inland passage ticket situation. Integral to these processes 
was the proliferation of the corporation as a form of business organization, with numbers 
of incorporated firms in New York mushrooming in the first sixty years of the nineteenth 
century. With the pooling of capital under one “roof’ made easier by corporate legal 
status, buyouts and their resulting consolidations could also be more readily made." 
From there, a single firm could come to dominate a given industry or other line 
business—such as transport in and out of a given hub. This was, after all, the time where 
individuals like Cornelius Vanderbilt could wield tremendous economic power by 
monopolizing steam shipping of both freight and people in the years leading to the inland 
passage ticket situation.100
Consolidation became the name of the game for what became New York Central 
Railroad, a main line operating out of New York City and owner of offices in Castle
99 L. Ray Gunn, The Decline o f Authority: Public Economic Policy and Political 
Development in New York, 1800-1860. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, 49. Gunn 
notes twenty-eight corporations prior to 1800, with 2,104 by 1860.
100 For more on this, see parts 1 and 2 of T.J. Stiles’s biography The First Tycoon: The 
Epic Life o f Cornelius Vanderbilt (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009). Especially 
interesting is Stiles’s exploration of how Vanderbilt used rhetoric to cast himself as the 
anti-monopoly, pro-competition people’s democratic champion while creating business 
monopolies for his own benefit. Vanderbilt would also get involved with New York 
railroads after the period covered in this paper.
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Garden.101 In 1853, four years before inland passage ticket fraud drew the attention of the 
federal government, the New York Central Railroad Company formed by combining ten 
railway firms into a single corporation. This made the New York Central the primary, if 
not the sole provider of rail transport out of the city to critical nodes for travel farther 
west such as Albany, Rochester, and Buffalo.102 That this constituted a monopoly in the 
minds of many is evidenced by hostile press responses to the consolidation. The 
Rochester Democrat pointed out the rather simple but significant consequences: “all 
competition will be out of the question, and whatever money is to be made out of the 
railroad business in this State, must flow to them.” Three years on, the topic was still ripe 
for discussion, with New York City’s Weekly Herald terming the consolidation a 
“swindle.”103 Swindle or not, such control over transport out of the city meant the New 
York Central commanded significant economic power. That many pro-consolidation 
articles came out of the Albany Journal, a paper founded and run by the influential New 
York journalist and editor Thurlow Weed, shows how that power could shade into the 
political realm as well.
It is obvious how vested of an interest, then, the New York Central would have in 
a ban on the overseas trade in inland passage tickets. Every inland ticket purchased took
101 Helen M. Barnard, “Report on Emigration,” in US Sentate, Executive Documents 
[1873-74] (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1874), 151. The document, 
though published in 1874, is detailing the early history of Castle Garden when it 
mentions the New York Central offices.
102 “The New York Central Railroad Company,” Albany Journal, June 1, 1853; Ch. 76, 
[1853,] The Statutory Record o f the Unconsolidated Laws Being the Special, Private and 
Local Statutes o f the State o f New York... vol. 1 1778-1869 (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company, 
State Printers, 1911), 1014.
103 “Railroad Consolidation,” Rochester Democrat article reprinted in Albany Journal, 
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easy money out of its pockets; the vouchers allowed arriving migrants to bypass their 
offices in Castle Garden. What was bad business for the New York Central was bad 
business for the depot, and therefore likewise for the city of New York—another motive 
can thus be added to Gulian C. Verplanck’s desire for a prohibition and his initiation of 
the discussion that led to its diplomatic pursuit.
The factors influencing European governmental cooperation on the issue are a bit 
more straightforward than those on the US side. There is little evidence that inland 
passage tickets played a part in any state-sponsored migrations from Europe, essentially 
due to an absence of state-led migrations during the mid-nineteenth century. Italian 
officials did little more than tally the numbers of in- and out-migrations, while most Irish 
migrants, if sponsored at all, saw aid come from the parish level. Similarly, German 
emigrants were overwhelmingly self-motivated individuals or families.104 What more 
likely influenced European cooperation is that governments of sending societies 
recognized that not acting against fraudulent inland passage tickets could negatively 
impact networks of remittance-sending (Irish migrants alone sent millions of dollars back 
home during the course of Famine migration). There could also be domestic 
repercussions if word got back to the home country that its citizens endured severe 
financial hardship upon reaching the US due to an illegitimate transaction done at the port
104 Donna R. Gabaccia, Italy’s Many Diasporas (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2000), 136-37; for the Irish, see: Gerard Moran, Sending Out Ireland's Poor: Assisted 
Emigration to North America in the Nineteenth Century (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 
2004); for Germany, see: Walter D. Kamphoefner, “German Emigration Research, North, 
South, and East: Findings, Methods, and Open Questions,” in Dirk Hoerder and Jorg 
Nagler eds., People in Transit: German Migrations in Comparative Perspective, 1820- 
1930 (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1995), 28-30.
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of emigration.105 In those countries where individuals were subjects and not citizens, 
failure to act against inland passage ticket sales could signal a failure on the part of the 
state to provide for subjects to the full extent of its responsibilities over them.
Just as US immigration policy has had many fathers throughout the country’s 
existence, there have been diverse motivations for seeking change in those policies. A 
few of those went into the push in the nineteenth century for a total ban on inland passage 
ticket sales in Europe. This theme of many origin points is an apt one upon which to 
conclude, as it again highlights how the State Department’s efforts in the late 1850s are 
but one instance of federal involvement in managing international migration. Heretofore 
understudied, it deserves a place along the winding path of US immigration policy’s 
formal federalization.
105 David Fitzpatrick, Irish Emigration 1801-1921 (Dublin: Economic and Social History 
Society of Ireland, 1984), 18-20. Remittances were also key for a family’s ability to 
begin and maintain chain migration and inland passage ticket fraud could inhibit this 
from taking place. For German examples of the importance of remittances and the 
prevalence of chain migration, see Uwe Reich, “Emigration from Regierungsbezirk 
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